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This thesis discusses the significance of veiling in Iran
within its sociohistorical context. From the governmental
banning of veiling prior to the Islamic Revolution to the
obl~gatory veiling policy that followed it, state reform has
been tied to women's dress reform. As political and religious
leaders in Iran have defined the meaning of .the veil differently
to further their own agendas, women's reactions to these
definitions have varied depending on religion, socioeconomic
status, and political involvement.
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Introduction
Women~s dress has long been a popular topic of
discussion among feminist theorists, anthropologists, and
historians, to name a few. Differences in women's dress
I
1
j
across time and place speak,to the complex way in which
women are perceived as well as how they negotiate their
position in society. Veiling in Iran is one of many
subjects'that reflect this comp;Licated relationship between
women, dress, and society at large.
This thesis focuses on veiling in Iran for several
reasons. ,First of all, it impresses me that a simple piece
of cloth has such a complex history. An analysis of
veiling illustrates the point that dress is bound to its
cultural context, and the various meanings of veiling over
time reinforce this link between dress and culture.
According to Faegheh Shirazi, a professor in Islamic
Studies at the University of Texas, in Iran the ~political
and religious agenda has continually redefined the image of
a woman's body, her clothes, adornment, make-up, and
attitude"{~IslamicReligion" 122). From the governmental
banning of veiling prior to the Islamic Revolution to the
obligatory veiling policy that followed it, state reform
has been tied to wo~en's dress reform.
Iran with the hope that what I discuss can contribute to
opinion between those in the West and -those in Iran
issue in that of a Western/Islamic dichotomy; rather,
In this thesis, my
For instance, the
It is too simplistic to frame thisexisted within Iran.
present, are much more complicated.
main goal is to illuminate the complexity of veiling in
feminists. Unfortunately, focusing on the differences of
Debates over the oppressive versus emancipatory nature
obscures the diversity of beliefs about veiling that have
Much of my interest in veiling in Iran stems from ,its
about the multifaceted aspects of this issue.
feminists, particularly by educating Western feminists
the larger dialogue taking place among Western and Islamic
of veiling have often taken place among Western and Islamic
Iran's internal controversies over veiling, both past and
interaction with religious, political, and social factors.
How veiling relates to changes (whether progressive or
the context of Iran's political situation as well as the
regressive) in women's status and power also intrigues me;
dynamic area of women's rights.
therefore this thesis attempts to situate veiling within
abolition of veiling in the 1930s correlated with increased
liberties for women while mandatory veiling in the 1980s
went along with the restriction of certain rights.
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We cannot fully understand the significance of veiling
outside of its sociohistorical context; as political and
religiQus leaders in Iran have defined the meaning of the
veil differently to further their own agendas, women's
reactions to these definitions have varied dependipg on
religion, socioeconomic status, and political involvement.
The Significance of Dress and Veiling
There are many definitions of the term 'dress' which
vary in their degrees of specificity. I am starting with
the rather general definition given by Linda Arthur in her
discussion of dress, culture, and identity: ~The term
'dress' is used in the most global sense to refer to all of
the ways the body is used in the expression of
identity"(Religion 1). Clothing in particular plays a,
large role in this expression, for what we wear can take on
much more significance than the mere reflection of personal
taste. The meanings of clothes are embedded in a social
context; they are open to interpretation and susceptible to
change. According to Arthur, dress functions as an
important asp~ct of social interaction in three distinct
ways. First, the body and dress can be used as a social
resource in tha~ dres~ can manipulate certain social
situations; second, dress is a means of non-verbal
p. ti & University Archives University of Oregon Ubraries. This
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communication and shared vocabulary among people; and
third, dress reflects a person's personal and social
identity (Undressing 3). Arthur also argues that dress can
be seen as a symbol of social control because it literally
controls the external body (Religion 1).
According to Beverly McNamara, adornment and
manipulation of the body are common to all societies (25).
However, while the general functions of dress may be
universal, it is necessary to understand the cultural
context of clothing. In many Muslim communities veiling
has been, and often still is, a key component of female
dress. 1
In Islamic CUlture, veiling (hijab)2 is understood as
"concealment donned by women as a religious obligation and
practiced by Muslim women" (Shirazi, "Islamic Religion"
115). Women begin veiling with the onset of menstruation
and are supposed to be veiled in the presence of all
unrelated men (Naficy 137). Hijab can range from the most
orthodox form, chador, which is a long black garment
covering women from head to toe, to simply a colorful
headscarf. The term "good hejab" commonly refers to proper
] Veiling also plays an important role in the Muslim commooities ofnon-Muslim countries. In fact, much
has been written recently about women in Western countries who assert their right to veil, often facing
discrimination as a consequence. ':
i
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veiling while "bad hejab" means improper veiling (i.e. hair
showing). The varying types of veils as well as their
acceptability are highly context-specific and therefore
will be discussed more in'depth throughout the thesis where,
applicable.
Though veiling has complex meanings and has been used
for different purposes, traditionally its roots lie in
Islam and the Qur'an's mandate that women and men be
modestly dressed. Despite the reference to both men and
women, women are the ones usually constrained by a dress
code. It is important to point out that many people
believe the Qur'an itself does not necessarily restrict
women but rather, patriarchal interpretations of it are
responsible for dictating how women are to dress and behave
(Shirazi, "Islamic Religion" 124). The actual phrase in
the Qur'an referring to female modesty does not explicitly
advocate veiling: "Say to believing women that they should
observe modesty of the eyes and guard their sexual parts
and let them not display their attractions except those
naturally exposed - and let them cast down their head-
scarves onto their bosoms" (as qtd in Rahman, 40). Haleh
Afshar, who grew up in Iran and now teaches at the
2 In the literature, ''hijab'' and "hejab'; are often used interchangeably. The main distinction, I think, is that
"hijab" refers to the veil itselfwhile ''hejab" refers to the act of veiling. I have tried to make sure that my
use ofboth terms reflects this distinction.
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Univeisity of York, argues that, in Iran as elsewhere there
are many interpretations of this verse. Although most
agree that women should cover their breasts, opinions vary
in te~ms of how this should be done. Some Islamists
believe that a simple headscarf and modest clothing is
adequate while more traditional thinkers uphold the chador,
as the most appropriate form of concealment (Afshar 198).
According to Haideh Moghissi, an Iranian scholar
living and working in Canada, the practice of veiling is
embedded in a cultural context that emphasizes the danger
of femalesexuality3 and the need to ensure both male and
female chastity, by controlling women's appearances (20).
Fadwq EI Guindi, who has done extensive fieldwork on the
contemporary Islamic movement in the Middle East, softens
Moghissi's assertion by pointing out that Islam does allow
for the enjoyment of sex in the context of marriage without
limiting it to the purposes of procreation, but in the
public realm the behavior of men and women must be
desexualized (136).
While women are supposed to be covered, men are
discouraged from looking at women. The system of
looking/veiling in Islam is, according to Hamid Naficy,
3 The fear offemale sexuality is not limited to Islam; we can find similar themes in Christianity, Judaism,
and Hinduism.
I
I
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inherently aggressive; 2)female sexuality is so powerful it
can corrupt all; 3)men are weak and cannot fight women's
sexuality; and 4)women are innately exhibitionistic (141-
142). Though men and women are both at risk of se,xual
corruption, Moghissi maintains that it is women who bear
the burden of containing sexuality. Supposedly their
seductive powers distract men from paying attenti6n to God
and threaten the social order; men are seen as victims of
female sexuality with little control over their desire
(Moghissi 24).
Thus far I have attempted to sketch out the
traditional ideology behind veiling. However, these
concepts are not static; particularly in Iran, the
religious motivations for veiling have often interacte~
with political and social agendas.
BEFORE THE REVOLUTION
From 1925 to 1941 when Reza Shah Pahlavi was in power,
Iran went through a period of rapid modernization4 • The
Shah's attempt to westernize Iran had some advantages for
4 This included socioeconomic reforms, beuracratization ofgovernment, expanded infrastructure, and the
secularization ofIslamic law and culture.
one of the reasons for the increase in rural-to-urban
migration. Some came to the cities in search of
organizations, usually headed by female members of the
This was
But on the
However, mostly urban,
However, life for the urban
Even though the Shah had
royal, family, flourished (23-25).
mechanized farms (Tohidi).
population, such efforts were often unsuccessful.
hoping to find an easier life.
ones being targeted for absorption into industry and
employment, some came out of curiosity, and some came
participate fully in agricultural reform, as men were the
rural communities, women missed out on education (the
womenj according to Haleh Esfandiari 5 , their educational and
majority remained illiterate) and could not even
intended to expand social services to incorporate the rural
middle- and upper-class wom~n enjoyed these benefits. In
employment :opportunities increased, and women's
poor held contradictions. On one hand, they had access to
available for everyone, leaving many people crowded into
more social services, and there was·seasonal employment, at
other hand, permanent employment and housing were not
least, to provide cash for consumer goods.
slums (Bauer 142-143).
5 Haleh Esfandiari left Iran in 1978 and has since lived in the U.S. During the 1990s she returned to Iran to
interview professional and working women about their experiences before, during, and after the Islamic
Revolution. Most ofthe personal quotes in this thesis come from her interviews.
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While the Pahlavi era brought some improvements in the'
lives of a ,minority of women, overall their political and
legal status barely changed. Many authors (Shirazi,
Tohidi, Esfandiari) cite as an example of this, the fact
that polygamy was still acc~pted and practiced, even by the
Shah who had three wives. The secularization of Islamic
culture and the Westernization 9f Iran under Reza Shah
reflected political motives more than a genuine interest in
women's advancement (Shirazi, The Veil Unveiled 89). Reza
Shah's main concerns had to do with maintaining his power
over that, of the clergy and convincing the international
community of ,Iran's modernization. Any benefits for women
seemed merely to be secondary.
In 1936, Reza Shah made the dramatic decision to
abolish the veil. This act, following earlier attempts to
reform the dress of both men and women, reflected the
Shah's drive to make Iran appear more Western to the rest
of the world. The anti-veil~ng policy had widespread
effects on both men and women. Civil servants and military
officers were encouraged to be in public with their wives
unveiled, and school girls and teachers were actively
discouraged from veiling. Many women of the younger
generation welcomed th~s new policy, as did the Westernized
women and men of the upper and middle classes. However,
ocopied from material belonging to the Division of Special Collections & University Archives, University of Oregon Libraries. This
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the clergy was adamantly against the measure, and women
from traditional families found it difficult to comply. For
the most devout, being in public without a veil was
tantamount to being naked (Mir-Hosseini 153). Also, many
religious men were reluctant to allow their wives Qutside
without a veil, convinced that by doing so they would be
failing to protect their honor (Esfandiari 24). Those
women who refused to unveil faced the humiliation of having
their chadors ripped from their bodies by police;
consequently, many women stopped leaving the house (Shirazi
The Veil Unveiled 90-91). Another problematic aspect of
this policy was that it posed a financial difficulty for
those who could not afford Western clothes (Esfandiari 24).
As with the Shah's other social reforms, this one
privileged women of the upper class who had the resourges
to adapt to changing societal expectations.
When Mohammad Reza Shah came to power in 1941, the
government suspended the ban on veiling, and the chador
became a common sight once again. However, as there was
still an emphasis on modernization, veiling continued to be
looked down upon. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, who has done
fieldwork in urban and rural Iran, explains: ~It [hijab]
was a real hindrance tp climbing the social ladder, a badge
of backwardness and a marker of class"(153). For instance,
i
a "vi~ible schism" among women in Iran:
wi th chador," (153). Shirazi points out that modernization .1 ,I
r:
manyand
Therefore,
Rich women from
religious,elite
Fatemeh Moghadam, a university
My mother wore the chador, but I
bazaar,traditional
efforts and the subsequent connotations of veiling created
of unveiled/Western/rich versus veiled/traditional/poor.
Unveiled educated wome~ living in towns tended to
belong to "Westernized" upper and middle classes;
veiled women living in towns were educated at
home, often by tutors, in religiously sanctioned
subjects; and veiled women living in rural areas
were mostly illiterate, having been taught only
the 'rudiments of Islam. (91)
However, women did not always fit neatly into the diqhotomy
the practice of veiling.
with being wealthy, not all upper-class families discarded
"fashionable hotels and restaurants refused to admit women
Even, though being westernized was often synonymous
professor, . reminds us that "under the Pahlavis it was not
necessarily poor women who wore chador.
the
139). . Conversely, in some traditional households, mothers
would observe hej ab while allowing their daughters to be
was free to dress as I liked" (Esfandiari 94).
family was traditional.
landowning families also wore chador"{"Online Discussion"
bare-headed, as this woman from the provinces recalls: "My
while veiling was most common among the traditional and
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lower classes,
general rule.
there were clearly exceptions to that
T~roughout the reign of Mohammed Reza Shah, women were
slowly gaining more rights despite the growing power of the,
clergy, who voiced their opposition to such change,s " The
Women's Organization of Iran (WOI) played a major role in
the advancement of women. 6 Focusing on education as well as
legal advocacy, this group targeted traditional, working
class women in particular, with the idea that women of the
middle and upper classes were in less need of their aid.
Though the WOI paid attention to Western feminist
movements, it had its own way of promoting feminist views
in Iran that were compatible with Islam: uEach piece of
legislation sponsored by the WOI was drawn up after long
and detailed consultation with Islamic jurists, although
inevitably such legislation reflected a modern definition
of Islamic law"(Esfandiari 33). During the 1960s and 1970s
J
the WOI put increasing amounts of pressure on the
government to enact legal reforms for the benefit of women.
In 1963 women won the right to vote and some took
positions in the government. The Family Protection Law,
passed in 1967, was another triumph for women. This law
prevented husbands fEpm unilaterally divorcing their wives
· Photocop!ed from material belonging to the Division of Special Collections & University Archives, University of Oregon Libraries. This
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and automatically getting cUstody of the children, allowed
women the opportunity to sue for divorce, required husbands
to ask for their wives' permission before taking a second
spous~, and raised the marriage age for girls from 13 to 15
(Esfandiari28-30). Furthermore, the Family Protection Law
instituted special Family Protection Courts to deal with
marriage, divorce, and child custody issues. The wor was
active in educating the public about these new developments
and made free legal advice and advocacy available to those
women who needed it (Esfandiari 32). Depending on one's
economic status, however, the Family Protection Law varied
in its degree of influence. As one Iranian woman pointed
out, ~I believe it [the Family Protection Law] helped the
less privileged class. At least they got access to courts
and women lawyers ... As for the middle- and upper-classes,
despite the law men still managed to do what they
wanted"(Esfandiari 79).
By the 19705 women seemed to have made considerable
progress. They occupied some prestigious positions in
government, owned their own businesses and worked as
judges, lawyers, doctors and engineers. By 1978 almost 2
million women were in the labor force while over 1.5
million girls attended~school. Many educated, ~rivileged
6 For a more detailed discussion of the WOI, see Esfandiari 31-34.
I'
women" (34) .
with women's educational and economic advancement but also
ceiling:
One agrees that women
Nevertheless, according to Esfandiari, "the
in their reports of gender equality.
women felt equal to men, as this woman describes: "I grew
Under the Pahlavis, Westernization correlated not only
up in Tehran, in a Westernized, educated, and civilized
family.., I never felt at a disadvantage because I was a
had many opportunities, but she also alludes to a glass
Some women of the same class were not quite as glowing
woman"(Esfandiari 86). Another woman -asserts, "Before the
revolution... I never felt that my gender was an obs,tacle to
my progress" (Esfandiari 104).
At the university where I worked, I knew men and
women had equal chances for advancement. But I
also knew that women did not have much of a
chance of becoming chancellor or even vice-
chancellor of a universi ty. Even the chancellor
of the women's university in those days was a
man. (Esfandiari 79)
Though women were making progress in the 1970s, clearly
there was still more work to do to ensure total gender
equality.
aspiration to education, independence and economic
betterment was no longer exclusive to a small group of
with a new image of wh~t it meant to be a modern Iranian
woman. Anne Betteridge, an anthropologist who lived in
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once said in an interview that "in a man's life, women
father before him, Mohammed Reza Shah contradicted his
uncomfortable with the increase in women's presence in
Furthermore, the Shah himself"teen princess" contest.
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to follow "the path indicated in the mass media - being
count only if they are beautiful and graceful and know how
reflected this mentality, for example sponsoring a,n annual
A popular women's magazine at the time, Zan-e Ruz,
Iran from 1976 to 1980, asserts that women were encouraged
Not everyone appreciated the changes in women's roles;
beauti:(ul objects, fashionably dressed and made up"{114).
personal view. This point is especially salient
to stay feminine~"{as qtd in Betteridge 115). Like his
considering how often the assumption is made that an
fairly liberal policies regarding women with a sexist
benefit women on the surface may be just as oppressive to
expansion of women's rights is inherent to Westernization
or liberalization. In fact, a system which appears to,
them as a more blatantly sexist one.
public and the ease with which the two sexes could mingle.
empowerment was growing. Men, and some women, were
within some segments of society, a backlash against women's
shocked by the modern billboards and advertisements
Also, those who moved from villages to the cities were
,..
."
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featuring women's somewhat exposed bodies. The expanded
rights and independence of women coincided with what many
perceived to be negative effects of modernization, and the
two cpncepts became linked in people's minds {Esfandiari
36} .
During the years leading up to the Islamic Revolution,
more and more Iranians decried the Shah's policy of
modernization. Along with the influx of Western culture
came economic problems, and people began to feel that their
national and religious identity was being threatened. By
1979 millions of Iranians were participating in
demonstrations, calling for an overthrow of the monarchy.
All kinds of people were involved in this movement - the
religious and the secular, the wealthy and the poor, the
urban and the rural, etc. - but it eventually became clear
that the particular views and goals of the clerical leaders
were to dominate (Esfandiari 37-38).
Within the revolutionary movement there were clerics
and nonclerical thinkers alike who tried to reconcile
modernization and women's rights with Islam, arguing that
Islam supported women's active participation in education
and work. The basis for the constitution that would later
be adopted by the Isla~ic Republic can be found in the
ideologies of Morteza Motahari and Ali Shariati (Darrow
.. . . , University of Oregon Ubraries. This .
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310). . Both men att·empted to show how Islam could be
compatible with women's rights. Of the two, Motahari was
more conservative. He was in favor of women observing
hejab and advocated a public realm in which women could
continue to enjoy a diversity of economic opportuni~ies, as
long as they were segregated from men (Darrow 313) .
Shariati, on the other hand, was a bit more liberal though
he too challenged the modern notion of female emancipation.
As the westernized followers of the Shah and the
traditional clergy became more polarized, some women were
caught in a double bind, one which Shariati discussed. On
one hand, the traditional woman was considered backward and
ignorant, but on the other hand modern women were seen as
"Westoxicated. H This identity crisis, according to Iranian
journalist Camelia Entekhabi-Fard, particularly affect~d
the younger, educated women from the traditional class.
These women appreciated their education and independence,
but rejected media images of highly adorned, Western women.
This rejection influenced many to incorporate veiling into
their dress and behavior (as I will discuss in more detail
later on) .
Shariati supported an alternative image for the5e
women and upheld Fatima,: as the model. The daughter of the
Prophet Muhammad, Fatima was revered for her virtues as a
Revolution was the first Iranian social movement to
spectrum, who came together to protest the failure of
From participating in marches
Two groups of wo~en in particular were active in the
political science at the University of Paris, the Islamic
generate the involvement of women from allover the social
within the family did not prevent her from participating in
role in fighting tyranny. Thus, her traditional roles
public life (Darrow 311-312). Shariati's ideal for women,
as well as Motahari's call ~or a "separate but equal"
According to Azadeh Kian-Thiebaut, professor of
Westernized monarchy(127).
daughter, wife, and mother as well as for taking an active
public sphere, set the stage for a revolution that could
easily incorporate women.
supporting the revolution (Esfandiari 39). This is an
to organizing strikes, women played a significant role in
Western stereotype of the eternally passive and oppressed
especially salient point, one which challenges a common
Muslim woman. Regardless of the revolutionaries' actual
agenda or how things turned out later on, one fact seems
Revolution "stressed their own importance as social and
clear: the impressive participation of women in the Islamic
early stages of the revolution: religious, middle class
political activists"(Kian-Thiebaut 127).
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women with limited education and university students (Bauer
156). The women of the middle class had information as
well a~ financial security behind them as they began
challenging the Shah's regime. Universities were sites of.
growing religious and political expression, and at, this
time "there was a marked increase in mosque attendance
among students"(Esfandiari 37). Later on, especially as
news spread of the government's violent reaction to
demonstrators, more and more women, including the rural and
urban poor, became involved.
For the majority of women at this time, activism
included veiling, though its meaning was different for
4
different women. For instance, traditionalists observed
hijab as a display of their Shi'ite ideology and culture.
According to Betteridge, "in general, religious women
accepted the view that modest dress is necessary because
its absence excites men's attentions and leads to
undesirable consequences" (117) . For some of these women,
veiling had as much to do with their own behavior as that
of men; veiling could help discourage "their passion for
jewelry, ornamentation and the latest fashions"(Betteridge
117). Not only was veiling a sign of religious devQtion,
but it also inevitably tQok on political meaning as
Photocopied from material belonging to the Oivision of Special Collections & University Archives, UmvetSity ofOregon l,(t\raries. This
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religion became the main framework in which people
expressed opposition to the current regime.
Secular women also used the veil as a political
tactic, signifying nationalist and anti-Shah sentiment.
These women took up veiling temporarily for a specific
cause, and assumed that once the revolution succeeded, they
would able to continue dressing however they pleased. The
following quote, from a woman who was skeptical of the
revol~tion, illustrates how superficially some women used
the veil: "I was annoyed at upper-class women who put on a
scarf and ,took part in demonstrations and marches in the
morning and went to parties in their usual dresses in the
evenings and discussed politics in an abstract
wayH(Esfandiari 56).
1s1amist students made up another group of women whose
veiling had both religious and political significance.
Like older, traditional women, many students incorporated
veiling into their behavior, using it as a tool to keep
their minds off of superficial matters (Betteridge 117)
For others, though, the veil was more of a symbol and
simply served to mark their identity as protesters of the
Shah (Kian-Thiebaut 128).
The multiple reasons for veiling, as well as the
varying degrees to which women advocated hijab, illustrates
"
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the actual complexity behind a symbol that so many
Westerners have equated automatically with Islamic
fundamentalism. According to Kian-Thiebaut, ~in Western
eyes,. veiling and subordination correlate" (128) . However,
there is a definite distinc~ion between women choosing to
veil as a political tactic before the revolution and then
being forced to veil by the government after the
revolution.
The varying degree of significance which religious
leaders and female followers of the revolution attributed
to the veil demonstrates the lack of clear communication
between the two. groups. This lack of communication may
have ,had a lot to do with why women so fervently supported
a revolution that made no explicit promises to protect
their independence. It was obviously in the best interests
of the revolutionaries to include women in their struggle.
Though some of the more fundamentalist thinkers may have
disapproved of women's active role, they were dependent on
their support and therefore made vague assurances about the
future of women's equality. Most of their discussions
about women, however, were centered on the need to end
their objectification and exploitation under Western
influences (Darrow 30St.
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So why did so many women assume that an overthrow of
the monarchy would lead to a better society, one in which
their advances would be upheld, even though the actual
discourse of the reVOlution shied away from making any such
promises? Part of the explanation, simple as it may seem,
had to do with getting caught up in the excitement of such
revolutionary fervor without necessarily looking at the
movement critically. One woman attributes her involvement
to being "young and full of idealism,"{Esfandiari 60) while
another says, "I was swept off my feet by the
revolution"{Esfandiari 56). Yet another woman describes
the year before the revolution as one permeated by "a deep
and palpable feeling of brotherhood, equality, solidarity,
and unity among the nation"{Esfandiari 65).
Some women, especially less traditional ones from. the
middle class, may have supported a revolution cloaked in
such heavy Islamic terms because they thought that "Islam,
clerical leadership, and the invocation of Ayatollah
Khomeini's name were merely an instrument to facilitate the
overthrow of the monarchy... Very few imagined the revolution
would lead to the establishment of an Islamic
Republic"{Esfandiari 53). These were the same women who
may have taken up veilipg as a temporary measure, assuming
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that in the future they could return to dressing as they
pleased.
While the Islamic Revolution did operate in a
religious context, many of its female supporters were not
reactionaries or fundamenta~ists; rather, they believed in
a reconciliation of Islamic values with their current
rights, thinking this could be achieved through the
revolution (Betteridge 113). However, as would become
clear soon after Khomeini carne to power, other supporters
of the revolution did not have such liberal visions for the
future of ,women in Iran.
After the Revolution
Once the Shah was overthrown, the secular
revolutionary groups splintered and in the meantime
religious leaders established control (Nashat). Ayatollah
Khomeini carne to power as the ruler of the new Islamic
Republic of Iran. Almost immediately the position of
Iranian women began to change. Though the new regime
exalted women for their contributions to the revolution,
now that the Shah was ousted and Khomeini safely in power,
women were expected to return to their proper place: the
horne (Nashat). The Islamic Constitution reinforced
Khomeini's ideology of domesticity for women. According to
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the constitution, which only addressed women specifically
in four small sections, women should primarily be concerned
with family life. The constitution went on to denounce the
previous regime as being exploitative of women, reducing
them to mere sex objects or targets for consumeris~;
however, only vague assurances were made as to the
protection of women's rights in the new order (Darrow).
Very soon after the revolution, Khomeini suspended all
laws that had been enacted under the Shah, although he did
allow women to keep the right to vote, to be elected to
parliament and to hold cabinet positions. They could not
become judges, however, and the regime launched a pUblic
campaign promoting women's maternal roles (Esfandiari)
instance, polygamy was once again acceptable, men could
and Secondary schools were segregated by sex as were the
seats in university~classroomsand on buses. Though total
Primary
In addition to these changes in the law,
Khomeini suspended the Family Protection Law, which
resulted in the dismantling of the Family Protection C9urts
as well as the regression of certain rights for women. For
girls was lowered from 18 to 13, in keeping with Islamic
unilaterally divorce their wives, and the marriage age for
custom (Tohidi).
sex segregation also became increasingly common.
sex segregation on university campuses and in the workforce
her executed (Nafisi).
seem to be full of contradictions. On one hand, the
done them. As one Iranian businesswomen explains,
For example, doors opened for
In 1968 she was the first female cabinetparliarnent.
I was hoping that the revolution would open new
doors and frontiers for us. But my
disappointment began when the government started
clamping down on women. First the authorities
lowered the age of marriage, then they blamed the
failure of population control on women. The list
can go on and on. (Esfandiari 71)
Many of the same women who had so passionately
In fact, the first few years following the revolution
the Shah. Before the revolution, Parsa had been a doctor,
then a principal, and finally the first woman elected to
minister, in charge of higher education. However, after
the revolution, Khomeini removed her from office an? had
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supported the revolution, now questioned what good it had
It seemed that the reverence of women, so common during the
revolution, was starting to decrease.
veiling, and the promotion of maternal images reflected the
new government's attempt to push wome~ back into the
veiling in public legitimized their presence in the eyes of
suspension of certain rights, forced sex segregation and
private sphere. However, the presence of some women in
public actually increased.
more traditional women to work now that sex segregation and
denounced:
and difficulties, women continue to work... The revolution
women became doctors since male doctors were no longer
Furth~rmore,
In spite of all the obstacles
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their families (Mir-Hosseini "Divorce, Veiling and
FeminismH 149). In fact, sex segregation created many
Reza Shah used women's bodies and dress code as a
symbol of Westernization/modernization; Khomeini
used women's bodies and dress code as a symbol of
anti-West Islamization. Both governments (one
'modern' and secular and the other Islamist and
'traditional') used women as identity markers, as
symbols of the" ascendancy of the official
ideology, and neither cared what women themselves
wanted in this regard. ("Online DiscussionH 142)
the purges of both men and women from government jobs made
allowed to see female patients (Esfandiari).
Much of the new government's policies regarding women
jobs; all-girl schools required female teachers, and more
room for other women to take their places. This trend
breadwinner is the woman.
continues, as one woman asserts: "In many families the only
has failed to keep women at homeH(Esfandiari 141).
were in direct opposition to those of the Shah. Khomeini's
to "protect" women from the exploitation they had suffered
call for obligatory veiling was a large part of his agenda
in the previous regime. However, as UCLA professor Nayereh
the same motives as the Shah whom he had so militantly
Tohidi points out, in this regard Khomeini actually shared
On March 8, 1979 a demonstration in Tehran
their own form of dress (Nafisi). Initially, Khomeini
obse~ve hejab, with the black chador being the official
First, only government workers were required to
As with Khomeini'9 other policies, mandatory veiling
Just as some women in the 1930s had refused to give up the
veil when Reza Shah tried to ban veiling, many women after
the revolution resisted Khomeini's early attempts to make
backed down, but eventually he resumed his plan, step by
veiling mandatory.
commemorating the International Day of the Woman turned
into a protest against the new regime. Women called not
step.
only for gender equality, but also the right to choose
protests continued, though they were broken up, often
dress of women in high positions (Esfandiari); then all
established as obligatory for all women in Iran. Some
women in public had to do so, and finally veiling was
took up the cause of enforcing hejab: Khomeini's
1980s all women in public were veiled (Nafisi).
brutally, by the police, and three main sectors of society
revolutionary guards, the Party of God members, and
Islamist pupils and students (Afshar 203). By the early
had both negative and positive effects. On one hand,
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imposing the veil made it harder for women to do certain
jobs, like surgery, and it served as a reminder for women
of their "place" in the new society (Nashat). According to
Ayatollah Ahmed Azari-Qumi, a conservative cleric whose
discourse on women shaped gender policies of the IS,lamic
Republic, there may not have been a way to keep women out
of public life, but at least through hejab, they could be
controlled. Denouncing the display of women in the west,
Azari-Qumi promoted the "culture of hijab" as an anti-
cultural invasion tactic (Mir-Hosseini "Islam, Women and
Civil Rights" 171).
however, other women wpo had been restricted to the home no
For women who
On the other hand, veiling had the potential to
emancipate women by "legitimizing their presence in public
life,"(EI Guindi 175) making it possible for them to be
accepted in the workforce and develop economic autonomy.
has undermined the traditional gender-related dividing line
In fact, though conservatives may have hoped veiling would
make women invisible, Moghadam argues that "forced hejab
between private and public spheres" (140) .
had already participated in both spheres before the
hindrance to their independence than a liberatory tool;
revolution, mandatory veiling may have been more of a
doubt 'had many new opportunities available to them through
the ~cultu~~ of hijab."
Under Khomeini, the place of women was full of
contradictions. On one hand, the government praised women
for their active support of ,the revolution, and their
policies, perhaps inadvertently, allowed some women more
freedom in the public sphere. On the other hand, women
were expected to adhere to their roles as wives and
mothers. Such contradictions continued during the war with
Iraq in which many women participated, some even as
revolutionary guards. Despite women's involvement in the
war as well a,s their growing numbers in the workforce
during this time, the media kept perpetuating the state
ideology of a good woman being a mother and housewife. The
war also overshadowed any debates over women's social
problems (Kian-Thiebaut 129).
At the same time, the government's focus on veiling
grew even more intense. As Shirazi points out,
~criminalization bf offending public chastity by not
veiling properly coincided with Iran's mobilization in 1980
for war against Iraq" (The Veil Unveiled 94). In Iran the
image of veiled women permeated society. Even the
promotion campaigns for the Iran-Iraq War used this image -
on posters, billboards, and even stamps. Some images even
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depicted a veiled woman with a gun in order to fuse the
concepts of hijab and jihad, religion and war (Shirazi The
Veil Unveiled 103). Along with this image came the
pressure for Iranian women to support the state and send
their male relatives into battle. Again, Fatima wa~ upheld
as the model, inspiring women to emulate her piety (Shirazi
The Veil Unveiled 96).
Interestingly, ~while up until 1980 the veil was
exploited to distinguish the Muslim woman from the
'Western' doll, during the war with Iraq the veil was used
to distinguish the Shi'i from the Sunni Muslim"(The Veil
Unveiled 94). Not only had hijab come to symbolize Islamic
revivalism, but in particular it had to stand for Shi'i
Iran. Shi'i Muslims were not restricted to Iran; in fact,
they constituted over half of the Iraqi population as well.
However, their political and economic status was extremely
low whereas the ruling class was made up of Sunnis.
Tensions between Shi'i and Sunni Muslims had mounted during
the Islamic Revolution in Iran when Khomeini had urged
Shi'i Muslims in Iraq to follow Iran's lead and rebel
against their Sunni rulers. Throughout the Iran-Iraq War,
Iranian religious leaders tried to rally the support of the
Shi'i Muslims in Iraq,': although their attempts seem to have
been unsuccessful (Shirazi, The Veil Unveiled 95). The
emblem of Islamification and their dress code the most
1983 the official punishment for being unveiled in public
ideal way.
Since the late 1980s the
Iranian government's focus on veiling to distinguish not
only Iran from the west, but Shi'i from Sunni Muslims as
well reinforces the political nature of hijab.
rhroughout the Iran-Iraq war and after, Khomeini
that the state was clearly invested in keeping women veiled
for political purposes since "women have become the major
maintained his policy of ma~datory·veiling. Afshar asserts
was up to,74 lashes; this was changed in 1995 to a jail
veiling, according to Mir-Hosseini, "in 1994 there was not
of women's varying opinions on the subject of obligatory
significant identifier of revolutionary success" (197) . In
sentence of 1.0 days to 2 months (Afshar 197). Regardless
a single bare-headed woman to be seen in public anywhere in
Iran"("Div~rce, Veiling and Feminism" 154). This does not
the "culture of hijab." In fact, the whole issue has
merely taken on a new spin.
signify, however, that all Iranian women had fully embraced
dominate the political scene, particularly among the
younger generation who may veil but not necessarily in the
concern over bad hejab, or incorrect veiling, continues to
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In 1989, while Khomeini was still in power, the Social'
Affairs Di~ision of Tehran's Governor's office conducted an
investigation of the veiling practices of 3,030 random
women,. They rated women's hej ab from good to moderate to
bad. Good hejab encompasseq the orthodox black chador, a
colored or slightly patterned chador, or the maqna'eh, a
scarf secured over the forehead and under the chin.
Moderate 'hejab referred to a plain scarf and tunic, and bad
hejab consisted of a colored or patterned scarf. Other
factors, such as tightness of clothing, amount of hair
shown, and heaviness of makeup, also contributed to the
ratings. The report revealed that 23% of the women were
good ,hejab,29% were moderate, and 48% were bad (Mir-
Hosseini "Divorce, Veiling and Feminism" 155). Clearly,
although the government managed to enforce hejab, women
were negotiating its expression in different ways.
The debate over veiling did not stop with the 1997
election of Mohammed Khatami as president. Azar Nafisi, a
former English professor at the University of Tehran,
argues that although touted by many in the West as a
moderate cleric, Khatami has carried on the restrictive,
patriarchal legacy of Khomeini. According to Afshar, the
government's continue~ insistence on veiling reflects
religious leaders' fear of female sexuality as well as
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their attempts to resist western influences (199). Along
with imposing the veil on the general public, the
government also regulates the media's depiction of women.
For instance, in 1996, the Ministry of Culture published
codes for Iranian cinema that included the forbiddi~g of
tight feminine clothing, showing of body (other than face
and hands), and physical contact. The justification for
this proscription consisted of two main arguments:
protecting women from objectification and depriving men of
sexual pleasure outside of marriage (Shirazi The Veil
Unveiled 64).
Another more recent example of the Iranian
government's determination to promote Islamification has
been their "deportation" of Barbie, a doll that epitomizes
Western standards of beauty. Apparently she is to be
replaced with "Sara," a chador covered doll whose veiling,
in the eyes of scholar Farzaneh Milani, "represents a
community striving to define itself as a cohesive religious
entity." Many Westerners have accepted this definition,
believing that everyone in Iran shares the same religious
and cultural values. However, according to Nafisi, the
"tension between the Islamic ruling elite and Iranian
society at large has been vastly underestimated by Western
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obser~ers of Iran." Veiling is one such issue where
opinions aLe divided.
Mir-Hosseini asserts that women in Iran have always
had different opinions about hejab, and the debate over its
for traditional women to enter universities and the
Shirazi suggests that it has ~made filmmakers skillful,
workforce (Mir-Hosseini ~Divorce, Veiling and Feminism"
In,terms of the censorship in Iranian cinema,156) .
resourceful; and determined, "(The Veil Unveiled 65) as the
compulsory hejab has undoubtedly facilitated the ability
significance and implicatio~s continue to this day.
Proponents of veiling cite reasons ranging from the
practical to the symbolic. As mentioned earlier,
focus of movies has to rely more on dialogue, plot and
symbolism rather than just sex? Mir-Hosseini also makes
the argument that hejab has the potential to combat Western
class differences among women and promoting their
Western influence: ~They maintain that the veil enables
standards of wealth and beauty by reducing the visible
similar reasons, many Islamist women take pride in the veil
as a symbol of their culture and a tool for resisting
solidarity (~Divorce, Veiling and Feminism" 156). For
7 Not only is the subject of sex removed from films, but so too is the topic ofromantic love. For a more
detailed discussion and analysis of Iranian cinema and veiling, see "Chapter Three: The Cinematics of the
Veil" in Shirazi's book The Veil Unveiled.
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them to become the observers and not the observed; that it
liberates them from the dictates of the fashion industry
and the demands of the beauty myth" (Afshar 124).
for women (Afshar 200). As for the most orthodox,
martyrs' " ("Online Discussion" 138).
Furthermore, some Islamists argue that hijab protects
In comparing Iran with
keep women from oeing overly preoccupied 'with their
An ambiguous aspect of veiling is its potential to
women's modesty and honor and is seen as a sign of Fespect
the media, psychologist Daisuke Akiba found that Iranian
according to Gelareh Asayesh, veiling is tightly linked to
is that the culprit is 'stepping on the blood of the
respect for Islam, and "a common reference to poor hejab...
appearance (as I alluded to above).
the U.S., where women's bodies are very much on display in
women had higher body self-esteem than did their North
American counterparts (539) . However, an article by Minoo
Nobakht and Mahmood Dezhkam found that the prevalence rates
for eating disorders among female adolescents in Tehran
were comparable to prevalence rates in Western
countries (265) . While this similarity is most likely
accounted for by a variety of factors, it still throws into
question the idea that.veiling protects Iranian women from
the troubles faced by Western women.
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Just as the supporters of veiling have a multiple
justificatipns for their position, so do those who oppose
it. Moghissi echoes a common concern when she asserts that
~n the writings which view the veil as a tool of
empowerment, the element of choice is taken for
granted, while, more often than not, the element
of coer~ion, be it in the form of using brutal
force or intimidation, or social, cultural, or
political pressure~ is not even mentioned. (42)
Secularists cite this coercion as an infringement on their
personal liberty, and even some Islamists who would adopt
the veil voluntarily disagree with it being forced on
everyone: uFor some traditional women, the imposition of
the veil was an affront to their religiosity - changing
what had been a freely chosen expression of religious faith
into a rote act imposed on them by the state" (Nafisi) .
These Islamist women, with the support of a few religious
leaders and intellectuals, have tried to challenge the
legitimacy of mandatory veiling in Islamic terms (Afshar
198) •
Others, such as Moghissi, point out very concrete
flaws with the ideology of hijab that the Iranian
government espouses. For example, she questions how much
the veil,actually protects women from sexual assault and
harassment. RapeS still happens in Iran, and she suggests
8 Unforttmately, statistics on violence against women in Iran are rare; however, a BBC news article recently
claimed that "new statistics in Iran show an alarming increase in the nwnber ofrapes and murders in the
consumerism and erases class distinctions is also ,wishful
women"(~Online Discussion" 139).
between rich and poor in the Middle East, Moghissi
Furthermore, Fatemeh
that such an emphasis on hiding women's bodies actually
draws more attention to them (Moghissi 46). Moghissi
challenges another possible myth about the veil's
liberating nature by arguing ~the notion that hejab fights
Challenging mandatory hejab is not restricted to
and that even the material of the chador itself can signify
thinking at best"(45). Reminding us of the widening gap
expensive imported clothing to wear under their chadors,
layers of hejab is the sign of being an elite, conservative
Moghadam observes that ~in today's Iran, wearing several
describes how in Iran upper-class women commonly buy
clear class differences (45).
woman... Ordinary devout Muslim women do not adhere to such
elaborate hejab and express resentment when they see tnese
According to Afshar, in the 1990s urban, middle-class women
than the billowing chador. These women protested the fact
intellectuals writing about Iran; within the country women
in particular made efforts to wear modest clothing rather
are using a range of tactics to resist this policy.
capital Tehran," and that these statistics "suggest that in every six days a woman in Tehran is raped and
murdered" (Saba).
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there are countless other instances of more subtle
immolation to attract attention to the cause. One such
intimidation (Afshar 206).
For instance,
In 1994 she unveiled herself
As Esfandiari states of the Iranian women she
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person was Homa Darabi, a,former Professor at Tehran1s
veil, and a few resorted to the shocking tactic of self-
that a woman's job security was jeopardized if she did not
in public and lit herself on fire; her death sparked
adhering to the dress code.
National University who in 1991 had been dismissed for not
While the above mentioned example is an extreme one,
protests in Iran and abroad (Afshar 205). Homa Darabi's
at a seminar organized by the Ministry of Culture and
the harassment of improperly veiled women more seriously
self-inrumolation and the protests that followed did not
bring about dramatic change on the governmental level, but
Islamic Relation in 1995, there was discussion about taking
and condemning overzealous guards' brutal tactics of
officials did alter their stance somewhat.
interviewed, when ~asked how they would define women's
resistance against the impositions of the state over the
last seventeen years, most women assured me with one word:
defiance.
~ejab"(133). Again we see the veil as holding political
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significance; whereas during the pre-revolutionary years
women donned the veil to protest their government, now they
are, if not taking it off, altering its style in another
attempt to challenge authorities.
wealthier north Tehran, raincoats and overcoats have
"handful of 'Westernized' women" who object to forced
replaced the robe"(Esfandiari 133). As an Iranian
For instance, "in
Ironically, it is not just a
hejab more so than rural women.
Age plays an even greater role than geography when it
Of the 802 men and women the vice squads detained
in Tehran in July 1993, 80% were under the age of
twenty. The suppression of culture in the name
of defending against the West's "cultural
invasion" and the attempts at coercive
"Islamization" have made these youths almost
obsessed with the culture they are being deprived
of. (Nafisi)
Urban women seem to defy the stricter versions of
university professor attests, "the government has had great
in a city ,like Tehran. In the provinces more and more
difficulty in imposing the proper hejab on women, at least
girls have to wear the chador to go to
university"(Esfandiari 138).
comes to resisting hejab.
veiling, but rather the younger generation, "children of
the revolution," are most active in their protest:
-------------------------
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Esfandiari echoes this statement in her description of
!j.
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-I'
.,
female students: ~Young girls around the campus of Tehran
Univers,i ty wear colorful scarves, disclosing the tip of a
ponytail or flaunting their famous kakols, a fringe or bob,
of hair showing beneath the scarf, in the face of .
revolutionary guards"(133). Older women, on the other
hand, do not always show such rebelliousness, as one
businesswoman explains: ~I am personally too old to put up
a resistance against the hejab. Not that it is not
important for me. But it is not a central issue in my
daily life"(Esfandiari 142). Nevertheless, this same woman
as well as others, acknowledges that ~the way women defy
observing the complete hejab, the way they dress, the way
the wear their makeup is a symbol of women's
resistance"(Esfandiari 142). Another older woman declqres
she is ~full of admiration for these young women who show
their kakol despite all the punishments the government
inflicts on them"(Esfandiari 149). Regardless of the
Iranian government's attempt to enforce the Islamic dress
code, many women who were raised in post-revolutionary Iran
refuse to embrace Islamization f~lly.
In contemporary Iranian society the issue of hejab
continues to symbolize women's resistance towards their
government. As one woman insists, ~Hardly a week passes
Conclusion
all represent,at,ives of the government. And at the center
at the center of this battle, symbolically, is the debate
If the authorities had solved this
In the last century it has taken on a variety
women's attire.
problem, why do they talk about it so much?" (Esfandiari
147)., Another woman attests to the ultimate failure of the
government to intimidate wo~en by making veiling mandatory:
withorit a statement by someone in the government about
Whether banned or enforced, veiling in Iran has long
"At first I tried to go out as little as possible. But you
can't give into these pressures. That is what they wanted
according,to Nafisi, is one between "the people of Iran and
- for women like me who do not feel comfortable wearing the
scarf to stay home. We defied them by wearing the scarf
and being everywhere"(Esfandiari 146). The struggle now,
of this str~ggle is the battle over women's rights." And,
over hejab, which continues to this day.
been the focus of political, religious, and societal
veiling as part of his attempt to Westernize the country.
With the onset of the ,Islamic Revolution, many groups of
of meanings for a variety of purposes. Reza Shah abolished
attention.
women voluntarily donned the veil to protest the Shah's
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mandatory in his attempt to ward off western cultural
attempts to control th€m.
rights.
Instead, we can examine
Since then women haveinvasion and promote Islam.
Understanding hijab in its sociohistorical context
continually asserting their agency within a society, that
regime. After the revolution, Khomeini made the veil
The veil has been a hindrance to social mobility, a
Western symbol, a signifier of Iranian national pride, and
women to enter the workforce, a tool for keeping women "in
their place," an object of wartime propaganda, an anti-
sign of political resistance, an excuse for traditional
challenged this policy in both direct and subtle ways,
a powerful point of discussion in relation to women's
of Western versus Islamic values.
allows us to avoid framing this issue in simplistic te~ms
thesis has also demonstrated the complexity of Iranian
I hope that by.illustrating the complexity of veiling, this
women's lives as they continue to negotiate their
the ideological struggles taking place within Iran itself.
political, religious, and social agency.
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